Introduction
Economic growth and natural resource use have been intrinsically linked throughout history.
While in the Malthusian era land improvement and expansions allowed for population increases, in the modern economy era coal and later oil made the steady growth of manufactured output per capita possible. Because fossil resources have seemed so abundant for most of the time since the industrial revolution, our theories of growth could safely ignore the role of resources and focus on capital investment and technological change. However, fossil resources are non-renewable and at some point resource scarcity will be likely to restrict growth. The limited availability of our main current sources of energy gives rise to two possible scenarios:
either we need to gradually reduce energy use and prevent sudden declines in energy supply, or substitutes for fossil energy need to be introduced. Both scenarios involve costs and the natural question is to what extent growth will be influenced. In particular, the question is how the engine of growth in our modern economies, namely investment and innovation, will be affected.
To answer this question, we propose a model in which growth is driven by R&D and that integrates the use of energy from potentially two sources: non-renewable (fossil) resources that can be extracted without cost from the earth's crust and a form of energy that is produced by using renewable resources like solar energy or wind. Nordhaus (1973) was the first one to introduce such a substitute technology that is not constrained by exhaustibility, which he called a 'backstop technology'. Examples of already available backstop technologies for natural resources are nuclear energy, solar energy, and wind energy. We contribute to the literature by studying the effects of the availability of a backstop technology on the rate of technological progress and on the resource extraction path in an analytically tractable, general equilibrium model.
Intuition suggests that technological progress as the engine of growth might falter in the long run, because incentives for developing labor-and capital-augmenting technology become smaller as resource stocks dwindle and the increasing resource income share puts downward pressure on the income shares of capital and labor. Taking the existence of a substitute for fossil fuels into account, however, we find the opposite result: technological progress prospers instead of falters when resource stocks dwindle during the energy transition. Underlying the surge in innovation is a consumption smoothing motive: agents convert part of the resource stock into knowledge, thereby transferring some resource wealth to the backstop technology era. Moreover, we show that, if the backstop technology is expensive, a large increase in R&D investment is required for a smooth transition. As a result, the marginal return to innovation falls sharply and may even become equal to the return to conserving some fossil when the backstop technology is already used. In this case, part of the consumption smoothing will take place through a regime of simultaneous use of the resource and the backstop technology.
Finally, we find that due to the availability of the backstop technology, the time profile of resource extraction may remain upward-sloping until the stock is depleted.
The first building block of our analysis is the so-called Dasgupta-Heal-Solow-Stiglitz (DHSS) model. The DHSS model integrates non-renewable resources into the neoclassical exogenous growth framework. 1 Although the DHSS model does not focus on the energy transition towards backstop technologies, some of the early studies do take the existence of substitutes for the non-renewable resource into account. Dasgupta and Heal (1974) and Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1981) allow for the invention of a backstop technology, which occurs each period with an exogenously given probability. Kamien and Schwartz (1978) introduce the possibility of undertaking R&D to affect the probability of invention. In partial equilibrium settings, Hoel (1978) and Stiglitz and Dasgupta (1982) assume that a backstop technology already exists. They show that the relative price of the resource compared to the backstop technology increases over time and the backstop is adapted once prices are equalized.
In the neoclassical models discussed so far, gradual technological progress was either absent or exogenous. Barbier (1999) was one of the first to study the role of endogenous technological change in alleviating resource scarcity. Scholz and Ziemes (1999) investigate the effect of monopolistic competition on steady state growth in a model with a necessary non-renewable resource. 2 More recently, Bretschger and Smulders (2012) explore the consequences of poor input substitution possibilities and induced structural change for long-run growth prospects in a multi-sector economy. These three endogenous growth models, however, ignore the existence of a backstop technology for the natural resource. Tsur and Zemel (2003) fill this gap in the literature, by introducing R&D directed at a backstop technology. In their model, accumulation of knowledge gradually decreases the per unit cost of the backstop technology.
Alternatively, Chakravorty, Leach, and Moreaux (2009) assume that per unit costs of the backstop technology decrease over time through learning by doing. Both studies, however, are casted in a partial equilibrium framework. Accordingly, the existing literature on non-renewable resources in which technological progress is explained endogenously appears to suffer from a dichotomy: either backstop technologies or general equilibrium effects are being ignored. A synthesis of both strands of the literature is, however, desirable and likely to generate new insights (cf. Valente, 2011) .
After all, contrary to the presumption in the partial equilibrium literature that imposes a fixed resource demand function, output growth and biased technological change both affect the demand for the resource. Moreover, changes in the rate of interest induced by the energy transition should be taken into account, because they affect the level of investment and innovation, and the extraction path through Hotelling's rule.
There are a few notable exceptions that are not subject to the dichotomy criticism. First, Tsur and Zemel (2005) develop a general equilibrium model where the unit costs of the backstop technology decrease as a result of R&D. However, R&D is only possible in the backstop sector, so that effects on aggregate technological progress cannot be addressed.
Second, Tahvonen and Salo (2001) study the transition between renewable and non-renewable resource in general equilibrium. In their model, though, technological change results from learning-by-doing and does not come from intentional investments. Moreover, they resort to a Cobb-Douglas specification for final output, thereby ignoring poor substitution between resources and man-made inputs. Finally, Valente (2011) constructs a general equilibrium model in which the social planner optimally chooses whether and when to abandon the traditional resource-based technology in favor of the backstop technology. The differences with our analysis are that Valente abstracts from poor input substitution by imposing CobbDouglas production, assumes a costless endowment of the backstop technology, and derives the social optimum instead of the decentralized market equilibrium. Moreover, his focus on the optimal timing of backstop technology adoption and on the optimal jumps in output and consumption at the regime switching instant is different from ours.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the structure of the model. Section 3 discusses the energy transition and regime shifts. Section 4 provides a numerical illustration. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
The Model
We model an economy in which final output is produced with intermediate goods and energy.
The production of intermediate goods requires labor. Energy is derived from a non-renewable natural resource that can be extracted at zero costs, or generated by a backstop technology that uses labor. The elasticity of substitution between energy and intermediate goods is assumed to be smaller than unity, in line with the empirical evidence in Koetse, de Groot, and Florax (2008) and van der Werf (2008) . Technological progress in the model is driven by labor allocated to R&D directed at the invention of new intermediate goods. The remainder of this section describes the structure of the model in more detail.
Production
Final output Y is produced with energy E and an intermediate input M , according to
where 0 <θ < 1 and σ ∈ (0, 1) denotes the elasticity of substitution between energy and the intermediate input. Ethier, 1982; Romer, 1987 Romer, , 1990 .
3 Time arguments are omitted if there is no possibility of confusion.
Energy is generated by the non-renewable resource R and a backstop technology H:
where A H is a productivity index.
Final goods producers maximize profits in a perfectly competitive market. 
where p E denotes the price of energy.
Firms in the intermediate goods sector need a patent to produce one specific variety according to the production function
by firm j and L K is aggregate labor demand by the intermediate goods sector. Imperfect substitutability between varieties implies that the intermediate goods market is characterized by monopolistic competition. Each producer maximizes profits and faces a price elasticity of demand demand equal to (1 + φ)/φ. As a result, all firms charge the same price
where w denotes the wage rate. Profits of intermediate goods producers are used to cover the costs of obtaining a patent. Combining (2) with the intermediate goods production function, we obtain an expression for individual profits: 
where L R denotes labor allocated to research and a is a productivity parameter. The right hand side of (5) features the stock of public knowledge, to capture the 'standing on shoulders effect': researchers are more productive if the available stock of public knowledge is larger (cf. Romer, 1990) . Moreover, we assume spillovers from the stock of public knowledge to the backstop technology sector by imposing A H = N φ . 5 We define the innovation rate as
Free entry of firms in the research sector implies that whenever the cost of inventing a new variety, aw/N , is lower than the market price of a patent, p N , entry of firms in the research sector will take place until the difference is competed away. Therefore, free entry gives rise to the following condition:
Throughout, we restrict our attention to the case of a positive innovation rate. In equilibrium, 5 The assumption of AH = N φ implies Hicks-neutral technological change between intermediate goods and the backstop technology. Technically, the assumption ensures that the energy income share is constant in the backstop regime, as discussed in Section 3.3. Making this assumption is equivalent to assuming that the backstop is produced by using final output instead of labor.
investors earn the market interest rate r on their investment in patents:
By combining (2), (3), (6), and (7), we obtain an expression for the return to innovation:
where hats denote growth rates. The return to innovation depends positively on K, because of a market size effect. The termŵ − g, takes account of the change in the patent price over time. The parameter a has a negative effect on the return to innovation, because it is related negatively to the productivity of researchers. The parameter φ has a positive effect, because of its positive relationship with the mark-up on the price of intermediate goods.
Factor Markets
Equilibrium on the labor market requires that aggregate labor demand from the intermediate goods sector, the backstop technology sector, and the research sector equals the fixed labor
We define the income shares of energy and intermediate goods, and the expenditure shares of the backstop technology and the resource in total energy costs as follows:
Using these definitions together with (2) and the backstop production function, labor market equilibrium implies:
Resource extraction depletes the resource stock S according to:
which implies that total extraction cannot exceed the initial resource stock.
Households
The representative household lives forever, derives utility from consumption of the final good, and inelastically supplies L units of labor at each moment. It owns the resource stock with value p R S and all equity in intermediate goods firms with value p N N . The household maximizes lifetime utility 
The first one, (12a), is the Ramsey rule, which relates the growth rate of consumer expenditures to the difference between the nominal interest rate and the pure rate of time preference. Equation (12b) is the Hotelling rule, which ensures that owners of the resource stock are indifferent between (i) selling an additional unit of the resource and investing the revenue at the interest rate r, and (ii) conserving it and earn a capital gain at ratep R .
Dynamics of the Model
In this section, we discuss the dynamics of the model. Because the resource and the backstop technology are perfect substitutes, only the cheapest of the two will be used at a particular moment in time. If the two energy sources have equal prices, simultaneous use may occur.
Therefore, three different regimes of energy use exist: a fossil regime, a simultaneous use regime, and a backstop regime. We proceed by first describing the dynamic behavior of the economy during each regime. Subsequently, we describe the energy transition by linking the regimes together.
6 Note that final output cannot be stored, so that consumption equals output. 7 Appendix A.1 derives the solution to the utility maximization problem of the representative household.
The Fossil Regime
In the fossil regime, energy generation relies exclusively on the natural resource. The model described in Section 2 with H = 0 imposed can be condensed to a three-dimensional blockrecursive system of differential equations in the energy income share θ, the innovation rate g, and the reserve-to-extraction rate y ≡ S/R. The system is block-recursive in the sense that the system of θ and g can be solved independently from y. Beyond simplifying the mathematical analysis, the re-expression of the model in terms of θ, y, and g also helps to
clarify the economics behind our results. These variables, namely, have a clear interpretation as they are indicators of energy scarcity and the rate of technological progress.
In this section, we analyze the (θ, g)-subsystem described in Lemma 1, and we postpone the solution of the differential equation for y until Section 3.5.
Lemma 1 Provided that g(t) > 0, the dynamics in the fossil regime are described by the following two-dimensional system of first-order differential equations in θ(t) and g(t):
where the term r(t) −ŵ(t) is a function of g(t):
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
Equation (13a) shows that the energy income share increases if the price per unit of energy increases relative to the price of intermediate goods, i.e. if r −ŵ + φg > 0. Expression (13b) is derived from the labor market equilibrium (10), which requires that the innovation rate declines if the input of labor in the intermediate sector
Simultaneous Use Regime
The simultaneous use regime is characterized by equal effective prices of the resource and the backstop technology. As a result, the energy income share will be constant and the innovation rate will be declining over time, as shown in Lemma 2.
Lemma 2 In the simultaneous use regime, the income share of energy θ remains constant and is equal to
The innovation rate is decreasing over time, according to the following differential equatioṅ
Intuitively, as long as θ < θ S , the resource is relatively cheaper than the backstop technology so that only the resource will be used for energy generation. According to (8), g consequently needs to decline in order to ensure that r −ŵ = −φg < 0 remains satisfied: a decrease in g is needed to keep the return to innovation from dropping below the rate of interest as a result of the declining market size.
The Backstop Regime
The backstop regime is characterized by a constant energy income share and a constant innovation rate, as described in Lemma 3.
Lemma 3 In the backstop regime, the energy income share θ and the innovation rate g remain constant and are equal to 
The Energy Transition
Assuming that the initial stock is large enough to get
, the economy will start in the fossil regime. Due to increasing scarcity and resource using technological change, the energy income share increases over time until this inequality is no longer satisfied. At this moment, the fossil regime will end. Depending on the productivity of the backstop technology and on characteristics of the innovation process, the switch to the backstop technology can either take place abruptly or gradually through an intermediate regime of simultaneous use. Both cases will be discussed in turn.
Abrupt Shift
By imposingθ =ġ = 0 in (13a)-(13b), we obtain the following steady state loci in the fossil regime:
Moreover, by combining (9) with (12a) and (12b) we getR =θ − ρ, so that the resource extraction isocline can be written as
where we have used (13a) and (13c) to substitute forθ. The dynamic behavior of θ is illustrated by the horizontal arrows in the phase diagram. The real interest rate in the fossil regime can be found by combiningp Y = θr + (1 − θ)(ŵ − φg) and (13c), which gives
At points above the downward-sloping innovation locus, the real interest rate and output growth are lower than in steady state equilibrium, so that L K = K declines and the innovation rate increases over time and vice versa. The dynamic behavior of g is illustrated by the vertical arrows in the phase diagram. The figure also contains the dotted extraction isoclineR = 0, which slopes downward and has a vertical asymptote at θ = 1. At points above theR = 0 isocline, the real interest rate and therefore output growth are lower than required for constant extraction, so that extraction growth becomes negative and vice versa. 
The dashed arrow from point A to point B represents the equilibrium path when a backstop technology is available. The shaded area of the phase diagram is not relevant when a backstop technology is available. The dashed arrow from point D to point E represents the equilibrium path when no backstop technology is available.
Without the existence of a backstop technology, the fossil regime lasts forever and the economy converges along the stable manifold from point D to point E in Figure 1 . 8 This equilibrium path is characterized by an ever decreasing innovation rate and an energy income share that converges to unity. Peak-oil occurs at point P, where the equilibrium path crosses the extraction isocline. Because of the vertical asymptote of the extraction isocline at θ = 1, resource use is necessarily declining in the long run. The occurrence of peak-oil, however, depends crucially on the elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods and energy. If this elasticity is high enough, the extraction isocline is located entirely below the equilibrium path. In that case, point P does not exist and extraction is declining throughout. 9
When a backstop technology exists, however, the resource will not be used anymore if θ > θ B , which is the case in the shaded area of the figure. In equilibrium, the resource will then be exhausted at the moment when θ hits θ B and the economy will shift abruptly to the backstop technology. The negatively-sloped dashed line in the figure represents (15b) and gives g B for each possible θ B . Hence, point C shows the steady state equilibrium in the backstop regime, where the economy ends up immediately after the switch. The end point of the fossil regime can be found by using the Ramsey rule (12a), which implies that consumption should be continuous at each point in time as long as the interest rate is finite.
Output in either regime can be written as
Hence, given that prices and therefore income shares are continuous, due to the required continuity of output, K needs to be continuous as well. Accordingly, labor market equilibrium (10) with ω = 0 before the switch and ω = 1 after the switch gives
where g − F B denotes the innovation rate just before the switch at time T F B from the fossil to the backstop regime. 10 Substitution of (15b) into this expression yields the innovation rate 8 Appendix A.3 shows that point E in Figure 1 is the only attainable steady state of the model without a backstop technology that satisfies the transversality condition.
9 Note from (16c) that ∂g|R =0 ∂σ < 0 and limσ→1 g|R =0 = −∞, so that extraction would be declining throughout with Cobb-Douglas production.
10 We use the conventional shortcut notation x
at the end of the fossil regime:
The positively-sloped dashed line in Figure 1 gives g − F B for each possible value of θ B . Point B denotes the end point (θ B , g − F B ) of the fossil regime. The equilibrium path that leads to the end point B is indicated by the dashed arrow starting at A. Along this path, the income share of energy is increasing over time and the innovation rate is higher than it would have been in an economy without the backstop technology available. The innovation rate is initially decreasing, but as soon as the economy crosses the innovation locus, the growth rate starts to increase until the moment of the regime switch. Intuitively, in order to prevent consumption from falling discontinuously when the resource stock is exhausted, the representative household now starts to increase savings when the regime switch comes near. In so doing, the household effectively smooths consumption by converting part of the resource wealth into knowledge, thereby transferring consumption possibilities to the future regime in which the resource stock is depleted. In the figure, the extraction path is upwardsloping throughout the fossil regime, as the equilibrium path is entirely located below the extraction isocline. At time T F B , the economy shifts from the fossil to the backstop regime and the innovation rate jumps down to free enough labor for the production of energy with the backstop technology while keeping output unaffected. Note that the end point (θ B , g − F B ) is located below theθ = 0 line, i.e.
, which is a necessary condition for the abrupt shift from the fossil to the backstop regime to occur. Proposition 1 summarizes the findings of this section:
a < ρ, the economy shifts abruptly from the fossil regime to the backstop regime and the innovation rate jumps down at T F B .
Proof. The case in which the economy relies upon the resource forever without switching to the backstop technology can be excluded, because eventually θ > θ B would hold, implying that the backstop technology is cheaper than the resource. Hence, there exists a time T F B at which the fossil regime ends. Moreover, due to the inequality the end point of the fossil regime is located below the income share locus so that the price of the resource relative to the backstop keeps on rising until the stock is depleted, which implies that simultaneous use cannot take place, so that the economy shifts from the fossil to the backstop regime at T F B .
The downward jump in the innovation rate follows immediately when subtracting (15b) from (18), yielding:
Gradual Transition
If the inequality in Proposition 1 is violated, the economy will not experience an abrupt shift from the fossil to the backstop regime. In this case, the shift in energy usage occurs more gradually, through a regime in which both energy sources are used simultaneously.
Proposition 2 If
a > ρ, the economy shifts from the fossil regime to an intermediate regime of simultaneous use at T F S . 11 Subsequently, the economy shifts from the simultaneous use to the backstop regime at T SB > T F S . The innovation rate is continuous and equal to
at T F S . The innovation rate decreases during the simultaneous use regime and jumps down
to g B at T SB . During the simultaneous use regime, the real interest rate equals zero, the backstop expenditure share ω increases, while resource extraction declines gradually over time.
Proof. See Appendix A.2. 
In panel (a), the dotted arrow represents the equilibrium path of the fossil regime. In panel (b), the dotted arrow shows the equilibrium path of the simultaneous use regime. In both panels, the irrelevant parts of the phase diagrams are shaded in gray.
Initial Condition
To determine the initial value for the energy income share θ, i.e. to find the location of point A in Figures 1 and 2 , we exploit the fact that total resource extraction over time should be equal to the initial resource stock. From the demand function (1) we derive a relationship between the income share and the reserve-to-extraction rate y ≡ S/R at the beginning of the fossil regime:
where the function g = f (θ) is defined by the equilibrium path in (θ, g)-space. A second relationship between θ(0) and y(0) is obtained by deriving from (1) a differential equation for
By using (8)- (10), r −ŵ = −φg, and θ = θ S , this differential equation can be expressed in terms of y and ω in the simultaneous use regime. In the fossil regime, substitution of (13c) and ω =ω = 0 yields an expression in terms of y, θ, and g. The end condition for y is given by y(T 
Numerical Illustration
In this section, we perform a simulation analysis to quantify the transitional dynamics of the model. We focus on a scenario in which an intermediate regime of simultaneous use exists. As a robustness check, we also provide simulation results for a formulation of our model in which the resource and the backstop technology are good instead of perfect substitutes, according to a CES function. 12 We first calibrate the model and then present the simulation results. an initial reserve-to-extraction rate of y(0) = 55, which lies within the range of the reserve-toproduction ratios for oil, natural gas, and coal in 2008 of 44, 58, and 127, respectively (U.S.
Energy Information Administration, 2012). Initially, the ratio between the per unit of energy price of the backstop technology and the resource amounts to 3.6. 13 The current era in which energy generation relies on the non-renewable resource ends in roughly 4 decades. 14 The solid line in panel (a) of Figure 3 depicts the time profile of the innovation rate.
The innovation rate first decreases slightly over time, but starts to increase after the stable manifold has crossed the innovation locus. During the simultaneous use regime, the innovation rate is declining. Once the shift to the backstop technology takes place, the innovation rate jumps down to its constant long-run level. The gray line shows the innovation rate in a world similar to the benchmark economy, but without the availability of a backstop technology.
In contrast to the benchmark case, innovation in such a world decreases monotonically 
Notes:
The solid line represents the benchmark scenario, in which a backstop technology that provides a perfect substitute for the resource is available. The gray line represents the scenario in which there is no backstop technology available. The dashed line represents the scenario in which a backstop technology provides a good, but imperfect substitute for the resource. In the latter scenario, η is adjusted to obtain θ∞ = θ B .
before the economy switches to the simultaneous use regime and then decreases rapidly until the stock is exhausted. Due to the finite exhaustion time, extraction starts out considerably higher than in the model without a backstop technology.
Conclusion
We have investigated the effects of the availability of a backstop technology on the time paths of resource extraction and the rate of technological progress, taking into account that natural resources and man-made inputs are poor substitutes and that generation of energy with the backstop technology is costly. To this end, we introduce a non-renewable resource and a backstop technology in a simple endogenous growth model. The backstop technology can be used to produce a perfect substitute for the natural resource. Technological progress is driven by workers in R&D, who build upon previously generated knowledge. We solve the model analytically and develop a graphical apparatus to visualize its transitional dynamics and regime shifts. Moreover, we quantify the results by calibrating the model and performing a simulation analysis. The results are robust to relaxing the assumption of perfect substitutability between the resource and the backstop technology.
Our main findings can be divided into three categories: energy regimes, technological change, and resource extraction. Regarding the first category, we find that the economy experiences different regimes of energy generation. Initially, the economy relies exclusively on the natural resource. In the long run, the natural resource will be abandoned in favor of the backstop technology. In between these two regimes there may exist an intermediate era during which the resource and the backstop technology are used simultaneously. This feature is noteworthy, because the model does not impose the convexities in resource extraction or backstop production costs that are normally required to obtain this result. The reason for the existence of a regime of simultaneous use is the desire to smooth consumption: by introducing the backstop technology gradually during the simultaneous use regime, households effectively shift part of the resource wealth to the future.
Second, the introduction of a backstop technology in the model crucially affects the shape of the time path of technological progress, measured by the rate of innovation. Instead of monotonically decreasing as it would be without the backstop technology, the rate of innovation exhibits a non-monotonic development over time: it first decreases gradually, but during the run-up to the backstop technology it starts to increase. The reason for the surge in innovation is again consumption smoothing: by investing in innovation, households effectively convert resource wealth into knowledge, thereby shifting consumption possibilities to the future in which energy generation is costly. If the return to investment in innovation remains high enough, consumption smoothing entirely takes place through investment in innovation so that the simultaneous use regime disappears. Once the economy enters the backstop regime, the rate of innovation jumps down to its long-run value to release resources for production in the backstop sector. At any moment during the resource regime, the rate of innovation is strictly higher than it would have been without the availability of a backstop technology.
Third, the introduction of the backstop technology has notable implications for the development of resource extraction over time. The resource extraction path does no longer have to become downward-sloping eventually. Depending crucially on the elasticity of substitution between energy and man-made inputs, the extraction path can be monotonically upwardsloping or downward-sloping until exhaustion, or exhibit an internal maximum, known as 'peak-oil'.
The most important direction for further research is the introduction of stock-dependent extraction costs and pollution from combustion of the natural resource. In combination with the backstop technology these features make it interesting to compare the decentralized outcome to the social optimum, in order to shed light on optimal environmental policy.
Another useful extension of the current analysis would be the introduction R&D activities in the resource and backstop sector, so that the direction of technological progress becomes endogenous.
Appendix
This Appendix contains the derivations of the mathematical results in the main text.
A.1 Household and Firm Behavior
The Lagrangian associated with the profit maximization problem of firms in the final output sector reads:
The first-order conditions are:
where we have used
gives the first (second) row in (1). The third row of (1) follows from combining (A.2a)-(A.2d)
Before moving to the utility maximization problem of the representative household, we derive the flow budget constraint of the households. Total wealth is equal to V = p N N + p R S, so that the change in wealth is given bẏ
where the second equality uses (11). Nominal GDP can be written as
where the second and third equality use (3) and (7), respectively. Using (A.4) to substitute for p R R in (A.3), we obtain:
where we have used (4), (5), (6), the labor market equilibrium, and the backstop production function for the second equality. Using the definition of wealth again, we get the flow budget constraint in the main text.
The Hamiltonian associated with the utility maximization problem of the representative household reads:
where λ V denotes the shadow price of wealth. The necessary first-order conditions for an optimum are given by:
Combining (A.7) and (A.9) gives the Ramsey rule (12a). The first order condition (A.8) is the Hotelling rule (12b).
A.2 Proofs of Lemmata and Propositions
Proof of Lemma 1. By substituting the labor market equilibrium (10) with ω = 0 imposed into (8), we find expression (13c) for the return to innovation in the fossil regime. We use the expenditure share definitions in (9) to rewrite the first line of the relative demand function
(1):
This completes the derivation of expression (13a) in Proposition 1. To obtain the second expression in the proposition, we first differentiate the labor market equilibrium condition (10) to get
By converting the energy income share definition (9) into growth rates while using the intermediate goods price (2) and the Ramsey rule (12a), we obtain:
Combining (A.10), (A.11), and (A.12), we find (13b) in Lemma 1.
Proof of Lemma 2. In the simultaneous use regime, the effective prices of the resource and the backstop technology must be equal, as in the third line of (1):
Substitution of p E = p H N −φ and (A.13) into the third line of the relative demand function
(1) and by using p K /p H = η(1 + φ) from (2) and (4) gives .14) which implies θ = θ S and therefore proofs the first part of the lemma. To proof the second part, we convert (A.13) into growth rates: (A.15) where the latter expression uses (4) and (12b). Substituting (A.15) into (8), we find
Using (2), (9), (12a), (12b) andθ = 0 together with (A.16), we obtain: (A.17) which gives rise to the differential equation in Lemma 2.
Proof of Lemma 3. Using p K /p H = η(1 + φ) from (2) and (4), the relative factor demand function (1) gives
which can be solved for θ to obtain θ B . Combining the innovation return (8), the income share definition (9), labor market equilibrium (10), the Ramsey rule (12a), and the relative demand function (A.18), we find a differential equation for the innovation rate: .19) Because this differential equation is unstable in g, the innovation rate immediately settles down at its steady-state value given by the second expression in Lemma 3. By using the expenditure share definition (9), the Hotelling rule (12b), the backstop price (4), andÊ =K = −φg − ρ, we obtain: (A.25) where the last equality uses (A.21) and the labor market equilibrium (10).
A.3 Steady States
Here we show that point E in Figure 1 is the only attainable steady state of the model without a backstop technology that satisfies the transversality condition.
Proposition 3 The only attainable internal steady state of the model without a backstop technology that satisfies the transversality conditions is given by point E in Figure 1 . that this steady state cannot be attained. The economy can only be situated here if there is an infinite amount of oil available from the beginning (so that θ * = 0), which is impossible. Point E in Figure 1 satisfies the transversality condition, as (r −ŵ) * = ρ > 0 in this equilibrium.
A.4 Initial Condition
By using (8)- (10), r −ŵ = −φg, and θ = θ S in the simultaneous use regime, and (13c) and ω =ω = 0 in the fossil regime, the differential equation for y can be expressed as: y − 1, if T F S ≤ t ≤ T SB .
